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Abstract
Background: Limited research on Posting and Transfer (P&T) policies and systems in the public sector health
services and the reluctance for an open debate on the issue makes P&T as a black box. Limited research on P&T in
India suggests that P&T policies and systems are either non-existent, weak, poorly implemented or characterized by
corruption. Hence the current study aimed at opening the “black box” of P&T systems in public sector health
services in India by assessing the implementation gaps between P&T policies and their actual implementation.
Methods: This was a qualitative study carried out in Department of Health, in a Western State in India. To
understand the extant P&T policies, a systems map was first developed with the help of document review and Key
Informant (KI) Interviews. Next systems audit was carried out to assess the actual implementation of transfer policies
by interviewing Medical Officers (MOs), the group mainly affected by the P&T policies. Job histories were
constructed from the interviews to understand transfer processes like frequencies of transfers and to assess if
transfer rules were adhered. The analysis is based on a synthesis of document review, 19 in-depth interviews with
MOs working with state health department and five in-depth interviews with Key Informants (KIs). Framework
analysis approach was used to analyze data using NVIVO.
Results: The state has a generic transfer guideline applicable to all government officers but there is no specific
transfer policy or guideline for government health personnel. The generic transfer guidelines are weakly
implemented indicating a significant gap between policy and actual implementation. The formal transfer guidelines
are undermined by a parallel system in which desirable posts are attained, retained or sometimes given up by the
use of political connections and money. MOs’ experiences of transfers were marked by perceptions of unfairness
and irregularities reflected through interviews as well as the job histories.
Discussion: The generic transfer rules and ambiguity in how transfers are treated may explain the discrepancy
between policy and implementation leading to systems abuse. This discrepancy could have negative influence on
MOs’ morale which could in turn affect distribution of MOs. Where possible, ambiguity in the rules should be
avoided and a greater transparency on implementation of the transfer rules is needed. However, it may not be
possible to make any significant improvements to P&T policies and how they are implemented until the external
pressure that creates parallel systems is greatly reduced in translating HR policy into HR practice.
Conclusions: Effective P&T policies and implementation may have important implications for organizational
performance and may help to improve Human Resource (HR) policy and HR expertise. Also there is a greater need for
transparency on implementation of the rules. However, it may not be possible to make any significant improvements to
P&T policies and how they are implemented until the external pressure that creates parallel systems is greatly reduced.
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Background
Shortage and inequitable distribution of doctors serving in
rural and underserved areas remains a major problem in
many countries including India [1] with higher concentra-
tion in urban areas [2, 3]. The issue of shortage is linked
to poor coverage of basic health services in several coun-
tries [1] and poor quality of care being provided to people
[4]. Poor health outcomes are often caused by supply side
delivery problems such as absenteeism and overall low
productivity of Human Resources for Health [1, 5].
Posting and Transfer (P&T) is a mechanism to ensure
adequate and equitable staffing across the services and lo-
cations. But there is a dearth of literature and reluctance
for open debate on P&T in public sector health services in
India and elsewhere. Hence the issue of P&T is such where
although parallel systems emerge openly within the sys-
tems yet there is not enough empirical evidence on the
issue [6]. Poor P&T practices have been documented as a
cause of low morale, geographical misdistribution and mi-
gration of health workers [7]. Further, poor P&T policies
directly or indirectly prevent or discourage healthcare pro-
viders from either joining Public Health Sector or such
policies contribute to provider’s dissatisfaction with the
existing system and may lead to low morale, poor per-
formance, high absenteeism and attrition [8, 9]. Similarly,
lack of adherence to the policies or bypassing them and
creating non-transparent and alternative systems of Hu-
man Resource Management (HRM) systems can lead to
corruption and reduce worker morale thereby affecting
the overall effectiveness of the system [10]. However, the
effect of the P&T policies on workforce availability is not
only dependent on existence of policies but also dependent
on the way in which P&T policies are implemented. Hence
effectiveness of such policies depends on the degree of
“implementation fidelity” of the relevant HR systems [11].
Boxall and Macky [12] refer to the importance of not
only having the Human Resource Management (HRM)
policies in place but also the way HRM policies are
implemented. The Boxall and Macky [12] framework
suggests a causal link of between intended Human
Resource (HR) practices and the way they are imple-
mented by managers; the perceptions and behaviour of
employees; and organisational performance.
Literature on P&T suggests that systems with weak ‘im-
plementation fidelity’ or non-compliance with P&T rules
may lead to systems abuse and corruption [8, 13, 14]. La
Forgia el al [15] suggest that the mis-use of formal systems
come from the use of parallel systems driven externally e,g
through political interference, and internally by health
worker preferences. The lack of organizational governance
means that the implementation of policies can be influ-
enced by externally and internally driven pressures [16].
The current study focuses on de facto institutional and
governance arrangements relating to P&T.
Based on the work of Boxall and Macky [12] and La
Forgia et al. [15] we developed a framework that draws a
link between intended HR practices, actual HR practices,
HR practices as perceived by Medical Officers (MOs),
MOs reactions and its potential link to staff turnover
(behavior) and organisational performance. The concep-
tual framework, shown in Fig. 1, also draws from Forgia
et al. to explain how external pressures and worker
preferences lead to systems abuse.
Anecdotal evidence and limited literature suggest that
HRM policies on P&T in the government health sector in
India are non-existent, lack transparency or are poorly im-
plemented. The poor implementation of transfer policies
results in lack of staff at health facilities, staff not living at
posted centres, high absenteeism and political interference
[17]. The evidence from other countries indicates that
HRM systems in public sector can be inefficient and slow
[16, 18]. India also experiences a big variation in the way in
which HRM systems are governed and policies are imple-
mented across the country. Hence to address the issue of
rational distribution of health personnel, there is a greater
need to examine HR policies and practices relating to
transfer of Medical Officers (MOs) or doctors in the state.
The P&T system in the government health sector in
Pakistan has also been described as arbitrary and while
such systems may offer security and stability in the job, the
frequent and often inconsistent transfers make such jobs
unstable at the same time [8]. Schaaf et al. [6] describe
transfers in the health sector as being ‘Mission Inconsist-
ent’, as they neither maximize health outcomes nor respect
the norms of health care worker professionalism [6]. Sev-
eral studies have found that corruption in the process of
transfers is a pervasive problem affecting not only the
health sector but it also affects individuals [19–22].
With this backdrop the main objectives of the study were
to document extant transfer policies and assess how transfer
policies are implemented in practice to understand discrep-
ancies between policies and their actual implementation.
The main aim of the paper is to shine a light into the black
box of P&T systems in public sector health services in a
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Western state in India. Although there have been a few
studies conducted in other countries that aimed at under-
standing the issue of P&T from the view point of corrup-
tion, to our knowledge this is one of the first few studies in
India aimed at identifying the implementation gaps in the
P&T policies and systems for MOs from government health
department. The paper builds on empirical evidence avail-
able on transfer policies and practices in the public health
system of India which like other government sectors faces
the challenge of corruption [10, 21].
The health system of the study state
The Department of Health and Family Welfare or the De-
partment of Health is headed by the Minister of Health and
Family Welfare while the Principal Secretary of the Health
and Family Welfare is the administrative head of the de-
partment and responsible for implementing the policies.
There are various directorates under the Principal Secretary
which are directly involved in implementation of various
programmes and activities. The Department of Health and
Family Welfare in the state has three directorates (Health,
Medical Services and Medical Education) that are mainly
responsible for technical as well as administrative support
to the health related activities in the state.
The state is divided into six regions with all the 32 dis-
tricts in the state falling under the six regions. Six
Regional Deputy Directors (RDDs), one for each region
is incharge for the health related activities for the dis-
tricts that fall under their region.
At the district level, Chief District Health Officer
(CDHO) is the overall incharge of the Community Health
Centers (CHCs) and the Primary Health Centers (PHCs)
within the district. Similarly all the District Hospitals
(DHs) within the district are headed by the Chief District
Medical Officer (CDMO) of the district hospital.
DH is Public Hospital that caters to the health needs
of the entire district providing mainly tertiary care.
CHC is a 30 bedded hospital that constitutes the sec-
ondary level of health care and provide referral as well
as specialist health care to the rural population at the
block level. It caters to 80,000 - 120,000 population. Ac-
cording to health service norms, each CHC needs to be
staffed with specialists as well as regular doctors or MO.
PHC covers a population of 20,000 in hilly, tribal, or
difficult areas and 30,000 populations in plain areas with
4–6 indoor/observation beds. It acts as a referral unit for
6 sub-centres and refer out cases to CHC (30 bedded
hospital) and higher order public hospitals located at
sub-district and district level. Each PHC needs to be
staffed with at least one MO.
The MOs have been categorized into two classes: I and
II. Both Class I and II are gazetted posts and the state’s
Public Service Commission (PSC) called State’s Public Ser-
vice Commission is responsible for recruitment of all ga-
zetted posts including MOs. All graduate doctors are
recruited as Medical Officer (MOs) in Class II to work in
Primary Health Centres (PHCs) and/or Community Health
Centres (CHCs)) whereas those holding Post Graduate
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework for the study. Source: Based on Boxall and Macky [12] and La Forgia et al. [15]
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degree in clinical areas are recruited as Specialist as Class I.
In addition to specialists, senior level positions at district
such as CDHO and CDMO and state level are Class I posi-
tions while the MOs working with PHCs and CHCs with-
out Post Graduate specialization are Class II positions.
At the district level, Chief District Health Officer
(CDHO) who is a Class I officer is overall in charge of
the CHCs and PHCs within the district. Several blocks
or the administrative units constitute a district. Blocks
are administered by the Block Health Officers (BHOs)
who are also usually Class I officers.
Under the compulsory rural service in the state, all the
medical graduates from the Government colleges enter
the government service under the ‘Bonded’ category and
are required to sign a bond at the time of admission to
medical college that requires them to compulsorily serve
in rural areas for two years.
To address the shortage of MOs in the state, the Dept
of Health and Family Welfare in past recruited MOs
from such as candidates from private medical colleges or
outside the state. Recruitment of such MOs is called Ad
hoc appointment. MOs under ad hoc appointment were
appointed on a temporary basis and are required to pass
the states’ Public Service Commission Exam (PSC) in
order to be appointed as permanent employees which
would give them regular service.
Methods
Study design
The study used qualitative methods first to develop a
‘systems map’ for P&T to identify the extant transfer
policies with the help of document review and Key
Informant (KI) interviews; then to conduct a systems
audit through in-depth interviews with MOs and KIs
and construction of job histories to understand how
policies are implemented and to identify discrepancies, if
any between policies and their actual implementation
and the explanations for the discrepancies.
Study setting
This study was conducted in a Western state in India in
2013. This state was selected for this study as it repre-
sents the economically progressive states of India with
health indicators much better than the national average,
yet the state suffers from shortage of MOs and special-
ists, especially in rural areas. The vacancy and shortfall
in the state is 24 % for MOs at Primary Health Centres
(PHCs) while the vacancy and shortfall is particularly
high (77 and 93 % respectively) for all specialists work-
ing with Community Health Centres (CHCs).
MOs were included as the main respondents of the
study working for the government health department
placed at rural health centres from three different districts
from the state. The study wished to compare transfers to
the least and the most desirable posts and therefore se-
lected districts which were categorised, with the help of
several MOs and officers working at senior level as “desir-
able”, “not so desirable” and “not at all desirable”. As sev-
eral districts were identified in each of the above category,
three districts meeting the above criteria were selected
from there different regions from the state (out of total six
regions) for larger geographical representation.
Data collection methods and sampling
Document review
The current study was part of a larger study that aimed
at analysing several other HRM policies other than
transfer such as such as recruitment, placement and ap-
praisal. Hence a range of policy documents such as gov-
ernment orders, recruitment rules, appraisal formats etc.
were included in the document review. However for the
purpose of the current study that focused on transfers,
document review of the main policy relating to transfer
was done. The transfer policy which is called ‘transfer
guideline’ was made available from the government.
Content analysis of the same was carried out to under-
stand the extant transfer related rules and policies.
Interviews with KI
This group comprised of Informants who occupied key
state and district level positions purposively selected for
their knowledge of the study topic and to gauge their
opinions on the existing policies and how policies are
implemented. The study purposively included five KIs to
ensure that the views and perspectives of range of stake-
holders such as representatives from Health department,
administrative department and Medical Association
could be represented. Three out of five interviews with
KIs were conducted in Hindi (the main language spoken
in India) and two interviews in English as two KIs pre-
ferred to be interviewed in English) using topic guides.
The average time of interviews with KIs was 29 minutes.
Interview with MOs
This group consisted of Class I and II MOs who were the
main subjects of the study. MOs working mainly with the
Primary Health Centres (PHCs) and Community Health
Centres (CHCs) were included in the study as these MOs
are mainly affected by the policies. During the interviews
with MOs, brief job histories were constructed to get deeper
insights into transfer processes. The study used purposive
sampling at various stages while selecting the study respon-
dents. This purposive selection approach focused on ensur-
ing representation of both male and female doctors; those
with Medical graduate degree and/or post-graduate medical
degree, both adhoc and bonded doctors, doctors from Block
level; as well as regular MOs that were State Public Service
Commission (SPSC) confirmed from three different districts
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representing three different geographical regions from the
state were included which would not have been possible
through random selection. The total number of interviews
with MOs were conducted till the time saturation in infor-
mation was experienced. Each MO was interviewed only
once, making the total number of interviews 19 and all the
interviews were conducted with the MOs in Hindi. The
average time of interview with MOs was 32.3 minutes.
Data analysis
Document review analysis: Simple content analysis of
the documents was done to understand the existing
transfer policies and operational instructions. This in-
cluded the main policy document called “Revised Guide-
line for Appointment and transfer of Government
employees/officers” [23] or the term ‘transfer guidelines’
used in the paper to refer to the document. The guide-
line was available in local language of the state) but
translated in English for the purpose of analysis.
In-depth interviews
All interview recordings were transcribed verbatim and then
translated into English. Written consent was sought from
study participants and the interviews were audio recorded.
Important notes relating to Job histories were also taken
during the interviews. Interviews were analyzed using the-
matic framework approach which is a matrix-based method
to arrange and synthesize data [24]. The framework analysis
approach was best suited to the scope of current research
as the aim of the research was to present themes identified
in the data. To analyze the data, study objectives, interview
guide and methodology adopted were regularly revisited.
The framework approach was used to identify key words,
themes and sub-themes and the transcripts of the 24 partic-
ipants (KIs and MOs) were coded and grouped according
to the themes and sub-themes identified. A detailed analysis
was performed using NVIVO on the transcribed texts.
Job histories
Job histories were constructed from the information
available through in-depth interviews with an objective
to get deeper insights into the frequencies of transfer
and whether transfers complied with the guidelines.
Simple descriptive statistics were used to calculate aver-
age time for posting (including the first posting) and to
compare if such averages complied with transfer rules.
The analysis of Job histories also includes the time spent
by study respondents during their first posting. This
analysis is based for only first posting because the job
histories are quite varied where a few respondents had
not experienced any transfer or only one transfer while
there were other who experienced many transfers. With
so much variation in the job histories, it made sense to
look at first posting as all the study respondents held at
least one posting (the first posting) during their work.
Research ethics
Due to the sensitive nature of the study topic that in-
volved interviews with MOs and KIs, the study took
great care in maintaining confidentiality of the respon-
dents. The participation in the study was completely
voluntary. The ethical approval for the study was sought
from institutional ethical review committee at Indian
Institute of Public Health Gandhinagar (IIPHG). Rele-
vant permission for the study was also obtained from
the Department of Health, from the study state. Further,
written consent was obtained from all the MOs and KIs.
Results
The result section includes the demographic profile of the
study respondents. Next, the systems map (extant P&T
policies and rules) is explained. Systems audit (to identify
practices and implementation of P&T rules and possible
discrepancies) is explained next in the section. Several
themes were identified based on conceptual framework of
the study. Study results have been structured according to
the conceptual framework themes: (a) intended HR prac-
tices/extant guidelines for transfers; (b) HR practices and
implementation of rules. This sub section also contains
perceptions of MOs about the implementation of transfers
of rules and their reactions or behaviours driven by their
perceptions; and (c) knowledge of the MOs about transfer
rules which emerged as an important study theme, hence
it is another sub head in the results section.
Demographic details
Of the 19 study respondents, 3 were females while 16
were males. Three respondents were class I officers while
16 were Class II officers. There was almost an equal repre-
sentation of bonded and adhoc respondents (11 and 8 re-
spectively). As far as place of work is concerned, 7 were
from PHCs, 4 each from CHC, DH and BHO (Table 1).
Intended HR practices/extant guidelines for transfers
The transfer guidelines contain several rules, but the
present study only focused on two transfer rules as the
study respondents were able to share their personal as
well as general experiences mainly relating to these two
rules, mainly because these two rules were most com-
monly experienced across all the respondents. The first
rule included in the study states that a gazetted officer
of Class I and II should not be transferred within 3 years
of service and must be compulsorily transferred after
5 years of service at one place. The second rule included
in the study suggests that gazetted officers should not
use influence of any parliament or legislative assembly
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member for getting transfer at particular post [25]. More
details of these two rules are given in Table 2.
The content analysis of the ‘transfer guideline’ carried
out under the study suggested that several transfer re-
lated rules have broad conditions under which such
rules may not be completely implemented.
One of the KIs suggested that the Health Department
has some degree of flexibility to implement the transfer
guidelines. However, to what degree such flexibility ex-
ists is not clearly stated anywhere in the documents.
“As far as transfer is concerned, there is no separate
transfer guideline [for the health sector]. The
guidelines issued by Administrative Department is the
same for all other officers [from different
departments] like accounts, treasury, engineering and
for doctors and sometimes these guidelines are not
adhered” (KI 1)
“There are transfer rules for all employees- Class I,
Class II, Class III as well as Class IV. The government
has made policies but as there is shortage of doctors
so health department is given some relaxation but
such relaxation is not official. Since a doctor works
for public so ‘Public interest’ is taken into
consideration when such guidelines are applied to
health department” (KI 5)
“Health department or any other department can
make minor changes in the transfer guideline as per
their need……. But if a major change needs to be
made in any department then prior approval of
administrative department is needed” (KI 5)
HR practices and implementation of rules
In this section, we present the job history of the MOs as
well as the responses of the KIs and MOs against each
of the rule discussed in Table 2 to assess the actual im-
plementation of transfer rules. This section also reflects
the perceptions of MOs about the transfer rules and the
actual transfer systems and MOs’ reactions driven by
perceptions.
Rule 1: The 3 and 5 year rule The job histories of the
MOs reveal a total of 73 transfers were experienced by
the 19 MOs during their careers with the government.
Of these, only 15 (20 %) complied with the Rule 1
(36 months to 60 months rule) while 58 (80 %) of the
transfers did not comply with the rule. Of the 58 trans-
fers that did not comply with Rule 1, 44 (76 %) that did
not comply with the rule 1 and happened within 3 years
(36 months) of posting while the rest 14 happened after
5 years (60 months) of posting at a particular place. The
Table 3 gives the details and shows the percentage of re-
spondents who held first posting according to Transfer
Rule 1. The job histories indicate that only one fourth of
the MOs held their first posting for time period between
3–5 years (as indicated in the 3–5 years rule) while in
75 % of the cases the rule was not followed. Non-
adherence of the 3–5 year rule is reflected both for mini-
mum and maximum periods: 42 % of the respondents
were transferred within 3 years and 32 % of the respon-
dents experienced transfer after 5 years of service.
Figure 2 illustrates the frequency of transfers with the
posting history of sample of the MOs interviewed. It
suggests that most of the tenure for postings for MOs
does not comply with the 3–5 year (36–60 months) rule.
The numeric data presented in Table 3 and Fig. 2 dem-
onstrate that Rule 1 is barely being adhered to.
The responses of KIs and MOs also suggest poor com-
pliance with Rule 1 both in relation to minimum and
maximum periods of posting.
Table 2 Various rules under the transfer guidelines
Policy/rulea Explanation of Rule
Rule 1: The 3 and 5 year rule A gazetted officer of Class I and II
should not be transferred within
3 years of service and must be
compulsorily transferred after
5 years of service at one place
(Government of …….b, 2005
Section 1, Page 3)
Rule 2: No use of political influence If any gazetted officer brings
pressure or uses influence of any
parliament or legislative assembly
member or uses political influence
for getting transfer at particular
post instead of following proper
procedure of getting transfer then
the concerned authority should
immediately ask explanation from
related gazetted officer/employee.
(Government of ……,b2005
Section 14, Page 13)
aThe rules presented in the table above have been shortened to authors’
numbering and descriptions
bState name has been anonimised
Table 1 Distribution of MOs based on demographic and work
profile
Class District 1 District 2 District 3 Total
Class I 1 1 1 3
Class II 4 5 7 16
Gender
Male 5 5 6 16
Female 0 1 2 3
Place of Work
PHC 1 3 3 7
CHC 0 2 2 4
DH 3 1 0 4
BHO 1 0 3 4
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“We do have administrative rules that no Class II
officer can serve in the same place for more than
3 years and in no event can any officer serve the same
place for more than 5 years. Unfortunately that is not
implemented. We are having rule that is only on paper
and is utilized only when some disciplinary or punitive
action needs to be taken against some officers” (KI 4)
“The three year rule it is not strictly implemented”
(MO 16)
“MOs can only be transferred after 3 years. However
there is no such guarantee. Transfers do happen
within 6 months, 9 months and in some cases after
10 years of service” ….There are problems in
deployment. It’s not rational and is done haphazardly”
(MO 1)
Rule 2: No use of political influence KIs and MOs
confirmed the existence of the rule about not using
political influence.
“One of the rules is that there should be no political
interference and if an MO approaches Political person
for his transfer, it is considered as bad behavior and
punishable action” (KI 1)
However, from the interviews it appeared that this rule
was not normally being followed.
“After health department transfers a MO, he/she has
to serve there for 3 years and only then can be
transferred again. This is a rule but it doesn’t happen. If
you have the right ‘Jugaad’ [Political connection] then
you can be transferred within 5 days also. Leave 5 days,
your transfer order is renewed the same day” (MO 3)
Most of the KIs and well as the MOs stated that use of
political connections is a common way to get favorable
transfers. Therefore Rule 2 is some cases in not
implemented.
Reasons and mechanisms for Transfer: From the inter-
views with KIs and MOs, the main reasons and mecha-
nisms found under which transfers happened were
following:
(1)Based on Request of the MO
(2)Administrative Reasons or Public Interest
(3)Punishment or Complaints against the MO
Request Based Transfer: According to transfer guide-
lines, transfers may be requested by the officials. While
such transfers were found to be common, several MOs
reported that their requests for such transfers were fre-
quently refused. The study also found that request for
transfers sometimes need to be supported with the help
of political contact otherwise transfers based on ‘Re-
quest’ are not possible.
“I was transferred in March 2008 to Place X as a PHC
MO and this transfer was based on request. The
transfer happened smoothly on request. ….My most
recent transfer also happened on request”. (MO 1)
“There are one or 2 doctors from here who have
served for 10–12 years but have not been
transferred though they want to be transferred
………..Transfer on request can happen is some
cases but in majority cases it doesn’t happen.”
(MO 12)
Table 3 % of Respondents who held first posting for various
time periods (n = 19)
















2 (11 %) 1 (5 %) 5 (26 %) 5 (26 %) 3 (16 %) 3 (16 %)
Fig. 2 Postings by length and frequency for as sample of MOs. X Axis showing the length of posting held in months. Y Axis showing various
postings held by five MOs
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“The most common way of transfer is “approach”
[political backing]. At least I do not know any MO
who has been transferred on request alone. One has
to use some kind of approach else the transfer is not
possible” (MO 14)
Administrative Reasons or Public Interest: A common
reason for transfers is referred to as ‘Admin reasons’. Ac-
cording to one of the KIs, the term ‘Public Interest’ pro-
vided a lot of scope for interpretation including political
patronage transfers.
“If some transfer happens due to political
connections, Government may give it the name of
‘Public Interest’. See the Public Interest term has
ambiguity and there are no guidelines that define
public interest. For example if a MO is not attending
the clinic or not behaving properly then he is
transferred in the name of Public interest. But if a
politician is requesting for a transfer of MO, this
person may be transferred in the name of Public
Interest and it cannot be proved. So that’s ambiguity”
(KI 1)
The study also found that the exact reasons for trans-
fer labelled ‘Public Interest’ are kept confidential and
never disclosed to the concerned MO. The MO would
only know that the official reason for the transfer was
‘Public Interest’.
“Public interest includes transfers based on
complaints but it’s a confidential thing. Public Interest
is something that is not informed to anyone. It’s on
file and is not informed to a person. But in transfer
order, the government will write transfer based on
Public Interest so that MOs can claim dearness and
allowance”. (KI 1)
Punishment based: A few respondents suggested that
MOs may be transferred as a punishment for a variety of
reasons. MOs also indicated transfers because of com-
plaints could be reversed if the person had good political
connections.
“Yes, transfers happen based on complaints. If there is
a complaint against a MO and if the MO does not
have any approach [political connection] then such
MO could be transferred immediately” (MO 11)
“If there is a complaint against a MO or an
enquiry like medical negligence or charging user
fee from the patients then such MOs may be
transferred” (MO 14)
Mechanisms for Transfer: Mechanisms for transfer in-
clude a) through mutual transfers (which are legitimate)
and two illegitimate mechanisms b) through political
connection, and c) involvement of money.
1) Mutual Transfers: The study found transfer by
mutual agreement between two parties (in this case
– MOs) as another form of transfer, although not
very common. However how the mutual transfers
are treated officially and under which category of
Transfer they are categorized is a matter of further
exploration.
“I wanted to go to PHC [x], where a medical officer
was working. He did not want to stay there, and was
willing to come to my PHC so we went to the
Commissioner and it was mutually agreed to
interchange our postings” (MO 5)
2) Political Connections: Most of the MOs and KIs
suggested that use of political connections to get
transfers was common. Common synonyms used for
‘political connection’ included: Jugaad, Jack,
Contacts, Approach, Pehchan, Takat. MOs said that
a very common reason for using political connection
– for them and colleagues – was to transfer from an
undesirable posting or resist transfer from a
desirable posting.
“In my opinion 80 % of the transfers happen due to
‘Jugaad’ and 20 due to ‘Request’” (MO 11)
“I had to put some political pressure otherwise my
transfer was not possible- pressure is needed”
(MO 13)
After so much pain, he [another MO the respondent
is talking about] used his ‘Jack’ [political connection]
to get himself transferred to [name of the place]-
There are no rules: ‘Jiski Jitni takat and haisiyat’
(Translation: ‘It is a power game’)” (MO 2)
“Due to political backing transfer takes place within
2 days, or may be someone is posted in morning and
he gets a transfer in the evening. I know a doctor who
was transferred at 3 different places in the same day.”
(MO 7)
Political influence is sometimes used to actually
create vacancies for well-connected MOs. Transfers
arranged through political connection are disguised
under category of ‘administrative reasons’ or ‘public
interest’.
“Transfers are sometimes done in order to create
vacancies for MOs having political contacts” (MO 15)
“If one has good contacts then he/she can get a good
transfer. Transfers happen due to contacts and it’s a
common way in our district also. In order to bring
someone, others may be removed. And they may be
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removed under the name of ‘administration need’
saying that 3 years have been completed” (MO 6)
“There was lot of pressure on us to get transferred ‘on
request’. Because if it is not on request then the
authorities may require strong reasons to justify the
transfer on papers. So we were forced to get
transferred ‘On Demand’ to XYZ PHC [name of the
PHC changed]” (MO 7)
3) Use of Money: The study found that sometimes
MOs paid money to get themselves transferred from
an undesirable posting or resist transfer from a
desirable posting.
“The main reason for us to be unable to get ourselves
transferred is lack of political connections. The only
way one can get transferred is either through political
connection or through ‘Money Policy’. For example, if
you want to go to district X [a desirable district for
posting] then the rate is 2 lakh rupees [USD3500]”
(MO 8)
“Sometimes they take money, but mostly the
transfers are based on political connections with
influence through political leaders and local leaders.
For this reason MOs are continuing in one place
for many years. But for MO who does not have
political connections, money is the next resort”
(MO 1)
“If I wish to be transferred then I can be transferred
by tonight. I just need to have 50–60 thousand rupees
[USD 1000–1100]…..And people bribe to get
transferred, almost 60–80 thousand rupees [USD
1200–1400] for transfers”. (MO 19)
“Oh yes! Use of Money for transfers is rampant”
(MO 16)
Knowledge related to transfer related rules
Most of the MOs interviewed demonstrated limited un-
derstanding about the transfer rules which was mainly
confined to the ‘3 and 5 year’ rule. Further they stated
that no specific briefing or guidelines were provided to
MOs at any time during their job. Some MOs were un-
sure which officers had the powers to transfer them.
Only four respondents knew that according to the policy
that the powers to transfer Class I and II MOs lie with
the Health Minister.
“I just know one rule, that once you are transferred
you need to serve in that place for at least 3 years.
You can only be transferred after 3 years of service.
This is the rule made by the government” (MO 11)
“Barring 1 or 2 small rules no MO knows about the
transfer rules. One of the rules is that a MO must
serve at a place for at least 3 years before being
transferred. I don’t know more than this” (MO 17)
Discussion
Although the study aimed at illuminating the “black
box” of transfer systems to find ways of improving staff-
ing, the study only throws a partial light on the issue
and has several limitations. While there are many
transfer-related rules detailed in the government transfer
guidelines, the current study looked at selected transfer
related rules experienced by the study respondents. Due
to sensitive nature of study topic involving sharing of ex-
periences on illegitimate mechanism used in transfer
systems, in a few cases the interviews with MOs reflect
the P&T experiences of other MOs rather than their
own. Also due to the complexities of the mechanisms of
transfers, it was difficult to quantify the number of
transfers that happened based on legitimate and illegit-
imate reasons and mechanisms. In addition due to sensi-
tive and complex nature of the topic, the job histories of
the respondents were not validated with the actual
transfer orders received by the study respondents. Fi-
nally as the study was conducted only in one state based
on views and experience on 24 respondents, so general-
isations about transfer processes in other states in India
cannot be made on the basis of this.
Despite responses from a few KIs suggesting that gov-
ernment understands that transfer needs of health depart-
ment are different than other government departments,
the study found that there are no specific rules for transfer
for health department. An earlier study done in India
found it surprising that no formal rules exist for transfer
of Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officers despite
the fact that this cadre is frequently transferred [26]. The
results also suggest that the health department has some
flexibility to implement the transfer guidelines. However,
to what extent such flexibility exists is not clearly laid
down in transfer guideline or any other document nor
was clearly suggested by any KIs.
The study also found that the transfer rules are not
strictly implemented, particularly the rule relating to
three and five year transfer. The main explanation of the
purpose of the 3–5 year rule is to provide insulation to
IAS officers/ civil servants against political pressures
from being too frequently transferred [25], but in fact
some MOs were using political pressure to get around
the rule. Non adherence to such rule has been reported
by other studies in India [27] and in the health sector in
Pakistan [8]. In the latter case the use of political influ-
ence was the main reason why the three year rule was
not implemented strictly.
Rule 2 in the civil service in is meant to protect
against political influence in transfers, but appears not
to be adhered to. In fact it was perhaps one of the most
common mechanisms used in transfer. So it can be rea-
soned that MOs who are not in a position to use polit-
ical influence for their transfers lose out. A study of
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doctors in Nepal suggested the use of ‘source force’ – or
the use of power and money - was deeply embedded in
the social structure and is the institutional modus oper-
andi for HRM in India public administration [14, 15]. In
a study done with bureaucrats in India, use of political
influence was found to be common [27]. The authors
suggest that despite some kind of constitutional
insulation available to MOs (in form of the 3 and 5 year
rule) against the political pressures, many MOs in fact
suffer due to political influence. Hence the overall bene-
fit from this rule-to the health system and the staff who
work in it-should be reappraised in future research.
There is no doubt that the transfer guidelines are not
being strictly followed; the question is whether this make
good sense in terms of human resource management,
given the labour market conditions in which the health
department is operating. We suggest several reasons for
weak implementation of the transfer rules. The transfer
rules include very broad and ambiguous conditions
under which such rules may not be strictly followed
often under ‘Public Interest’ or ‘Administrative reason’.
The study findings suggest that many times MOs may
be transferred arbitrarily where they either do not know
the reasons for their transfer or the reasons known to
MOs remained as broad as ‘admin reasons’ or ‘public
interest’ as reported by another study done in the same
state with IAS officers [28]. When reasons for transfer
are used ambiguously, the transparency of the system is
lost and then it becomes easier to use political connec-
tions in the transfer process. Another possible reason for
weak implementation because of the flexibility given to
the health sector in the use of generic P&T rules which
may sometimes allow certain parallel practices (use of
political influence or money) of transfer to take place.
While such a flexibility may benefit health systems and
certain MOs, it may negatively affect other MOs. Studies
elsewhere suggest that in the absence of clear rules and
policies, parallel systems emerge [21].
The study results also indicate that the overall transfer
system was very unpredictable. Some MOs do not get
transferred for fifteen years whereas others are trans-
ferred within a few months. For instance we found that
42 % of the MOs were transferred well within 3 years of
their first posting and 16 % within the first year of first
posting. Similar findings have been reported in India
with IAS officers where over half of the IAS officers held
their post for less than 1 year with transfers being erratic
and frequent movements of officers [29]. Yet another
study in India found similar violations in the transfer
rules as in the study reported here. The average tenure
of IAS officers in a given post is sixteen months and only
56 % of District Officers spend more than one year in
their jobs. Such transfers are violation of the recommen-
dations for a three-to five-year tenure in each post put
forward by the Ministry of Personnel and the Fifth Pay
Commission [25]. Studies done in India on P&T have
found that issues of arbitrary transfers may be harass-
ment for government employees [26]. The authors sug-
gest that the unpredictable or arbitrary nature of
transfers can demotivate MOs. This was the single most
important reason for demoralization and sense of inse-
curity in a study of IAS officers [26]. The significant link
of HR policies and practices on organizational commit-
ment and performance has been discussed in HR man-
agement literature [12].
Our study also found that while several MOs fulfilled
the required tenure needed under Rule 1 and requested
for transfer as per the rule, but it is inferred that there is
no one in the health department bound to comply with
such request. Studies done on the transfer of IAS offi-
cers in India confirm such findings where no one is
bound to comply with the legitimate requests of the IAS
officers for transfers [28]. Our study also found that the
corruption in the P&T process for MOs is not only lim-
ited to use of political connections but also found use of
money to get favorable transfers. Often such practices
allow illicit use of money to have other sources of in-
come as reported by another study done with irrigation
department in India which enable rent-seeking for the
provision of posts [30]. Also as discussed earlier that
while there is a provision where MOs can request for
transfer, such requests may not be often granted and the
health department need not necessarily entertain such
requests. So for the MOs whose legitimate requests for
transfer are not granted and for those who cannot break
rule number 2 (use of political influence), informal pay-
ments remains the last resort.
In order to address the parallel systems that exist in
the P&T, our recommendations are in line with La For-
gia el al [15] who suggest that the state authorities can
enact new and more precise rules governing HR func-
tions as done in the state of Tamil Nadu in India [15]. In
addition we also recommend that it is better not to
make exceptions to rules – even in the case of the health
sector – as this leads to ambiguities. Further, there must
be clear definitions about what ‘administrative reasons’
or ‘public interest’ mean to add transparency to the
transfer system. However, significant improvements to
P&T policies and how they are implemented may not be
possible until the external pressure that creates parallel
systems is greatly reduced [15].
To address the poor knowledge of MOs about the
transfer rules, which is a transparency issue, we rec-
ommend improving the information related to trans-
fer rules and their implementation. Similar study in
India suggest state-led accountability mechanisms on
improving the availability of information on HRM
policies and practices that as is underway in some
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India states such as Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Odi-
sha [16].
Information about available vacancies, like the one




provided to MOs. When fresh recruits are posted to un-
deserved areas, the length of the posting should be made
clear to them and they should be assured that once such a
tenure is completed they will be transferred to areas of their
choice. Although movement from underserved to preferred
locations is not a direct promotion for MOs, but it may be
a very powerful way to address the morale of MOs. Such a
system exists in Nepal health system where health workers
who have served in rural areas may get priority for promo-
tion [31]. The movement from most underserved to pre-
ferred locations must be based on availability of vacancies
that may be made available to MOs through a systems
similar to ‘counselling’ and the requests of the MOs for
such transfers. However the health department must en-
sure that such requests are considered.
Conclusion
Our study aimed at opening the ‘black box’ of P&T sys-
tems in public sector health services in a Western state
in India by assessing the implementation gaps between
P&T policies and their actual implementation. Results
suggest that the transfer guidelines are not implemented
robustly, indicating a significant gap between policy and
actual implementation. The broad transfer rules and am-
biguity in how transfers are treated may explain the dis-
crepancy between policy and implementation leading to
systems abuse and corruption.
The study found that overall transfer system for MOs
was marked by perceptions of unfairness and irregular-
ities. The P&T system was characterized by de facto in-
stitutional mechanisms where the formal transfer rules
are undermined by a parallel system in which desirable
posts can be attained, retained or sometimes given up
(to move to a more desirable place) by use of political
connections and in some cases by use of money. Some
plausible reasons for poor implementation of P&T pol-
icies could be: (1) the flexibility allowed to the health de-
partment in implementing transfer rules and absence of
any document or common understanding among policy
implementers as to what level this flexibility really exists
(2) the broad reasons under which transfers are done
such as ‘Admin reason’ and ‘Public Interest’.
Effective P&T policies and implementation may have
important implications for organizational performance
and may help to improve Human Resource (HR) policy
and HR expertise. The benefit of the 3–5 year posting rule
should be reappraised. Where possible, ambiguity in the
rules should be avoided. Greater transparency on imple-
mentation of the rules is needed. However, it may not be
possible to make any significant improvements to P&T
policies and how they are implemented until the external
pressure that creates parallel systems is greatly reduced.
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